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Home Deployment 2012 Operation Phoenix Rising (Completed Oct 2012)

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Operation Phoenix Rising (Completed Oct 2012) PDF Print E-mail
Written by Nublet   
Monday, 15 October 2012 00:00


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DECLASSIFIED

INFORMATION DOSSIER:
OPERATION PHOENIX RISING

Deployment 3 Made by Nublet

________________________________________________________
Background Situation: 

As U.S. Army is still in Afghanistan doing daily operations against the Taliban, the U.S. department of defence refuse to sit by and let this operations happening. We need to find the "Source" said highly ranked officer in the U.S. Army HQ in Kabul "That will stop the Taliban and Global Terror". 

Codename "Baracooda":

Is a CIA operation in lingor island. from watchovers that been on the ARL camps at lingor they have been provided with Heavy Weaponry. (Grad and Katyusha rockets with aproxemtly 100-120 km range which can hit lingor Big cities.) 
Main Objective of operation Baracooda was to Find the Source of the ARL which should have been much more easier as to find the Source in Afghanistan as there was no U.S. Army presence in Lingor since Operation Snake Charmer. 

On the 27th Aug Operation Baracooda got Green light on taking out the heavy weaponry after finding out that last delivery of weapons contained Chemical Rocket Heads. 
4 CIA Operatives Assualt the ARL base In South East of Lingor killing 5 ARL terrorists and destroying the Ammo Caches. 

The amount of intelligence the CIA got from the ARL base was worth more then gold by having the camps leaders that is probly one of the KIA's Sat Phone and list phones that been made just made the finger pointing much more Harder on Afghanistan. 

 
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HUMINT

COLLECTION: Information collected via listening posts in Zargabad and informant networks on behalf of <REDACTED>. Intelligence collection continues to be gathered on local populous via OSINT and agents on the ground. Information saturation not complete due to decreased enemy activity in AO and capture and subsequent execution of ISAF-friendly informants. Multinational satellite data available on demand courtesy of <REDACTED>.

CIVILIAN POPULATION (CIVPOP)

CIVPOP Demographics:
POPULATION: 201,546
MAIN ETHNIC GROUP: Pashtun (98%) Balock, Hazara and Tajik minorities.
LANGUAGE: Dari (50%) Pashto (35%) Other Minor languages (15%)
RELIGION: 99% Muslim - 80-85% Sunni, 15-19% Shi’a.

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Typical Afghan dress of local CIVPOP. Commanders are advised OPFOR may be dressed similarly. 

CIVPOP Comments:
- Mostly in support of ISAF forces.
- Those engaging in belligerent activities (e.g planting IEDs) are usually either bribed or coerced in doing so and are otherwise not aligned to OPFOR.
- The actions of Taskforce elements in the AO are likely to have a strong effect on CIVPOP alignment.
- 36-43% have a family member in the Afghan National Army (ANA).
- Mainly employed in agriculture or trade.
- 23-31% of CIVPOP own motor vehicles and use them regularly.

Commanders are advised to seek up-to-date advice on CIVPOP prior to the mission commencing and to research Pashtun culture.

OPPOSING FORCES (OPFOR)

OPFOR Overview:
DRESS: Traditional Afghan garments, often with identity-obscuring headgear. May wear assorted military equipment.
MORALE: High, currently in control of large portions of AO with recent victories.
COMBAT EXPERIENCE: Majority highly experienced.
MILITARY TRAINING: Some former ANA with an understanding of infantry tactics.

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Typical Taliban dress state. Commanders are to note that OPFOR have no set uniform and dress may vary drastically.

OPFOR MT Capability:
CIVILIAN: OPFOR known to use CIVPOP vehicles.
TECHNICAL: Not known.
ARMOR: Not known. Informants report OPFOR have used military vehicles in the past.
AIR: None

OPFOR Weapons Capability:
SMALL ARMS: Some Mixed AK-variant automatic rifles seen in the past. RPK-machine guns probable. Thrown explosives unknown but likely.
ANTI TANK: Light AT in the form of RPG variants seen.
ANTI AIR: Not known.
HMG: Probable
IDF: Not known. 
AP/AT Mine/IED: Unknown, presumed high threat.

CBRN Capability
CHEMICAL: Not known
BIOLOGICAL: Currently not known. Biowaste known to be used in IEDs in the past.
RADIOLOGICAL: Not known but highly unlikely.
NUCLEAR: Not known but highly unlikely. 

OPFOR Service Support 
COMMAND AND CONTROL: No known structure, assumed typical Taliban provincial hierarchy.
MUNITIONS: Reports of ammunition caches in AO but no specific location.
FUEL/POL: 
MEDICAL: Established casualty evacuation chain. OPFOR Known to use civilian hospitals or pro-Al-Qaeda doctors.
REINFORCEMENTS: Unknown but if extant likely to approach from North.

OPFOR Actions:
- Generally low activity as of recent but difficult to distinguish between CIVPOP and OPFOR.
- Increased vehicle activity in Hazar Bagh
- Increased activity in mountains to NW of Zargabad according to CIVPOP informants.
-Informants report main body of OPFOR come from the North when approaching Zargabad.
- OPFOR have been intimidating local Opium farmers.
- OPFOR is not currently popular with local CIVPOP due to recent public stonings of Shi'a clerics.


GEOINT
COLLECTION: Mainly OSINT but some geospatial data gathered through <REDACTED> agents operating within Zargabad.

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Climate data for Zargabad as of 2011.

Unit commanders are to refer to mission brief prior to operation as to weather, first/last light and moon state at H-hour.

Terrain Summary
-Mixed arable and desert terrain in rural outskirts with scattered farmsteads.
-Dense urban zone in central Zargabad.
-Generally flat topography around urban zone.
-Vegetated wadis surrounding urban zone.
-No large bodies of water.
-Boundaries marked by light fencing and low mud walls. 

Infrastructure:
ROADS: Dirt tracks in rural areas with metaled Main Supply Route (MSR) tarmac roads in Urban zone.
RESIDENTIAL: Ranging from traditional farm compounds to small multistory apartment blocks.
COMMERCIAL: Marketplace in central urban district, busy during peak hours.
INDUSTRY: Scattered industrial buildings and functioning oil wells throughout AO.
POWER: Regular supply of electric power from plant to North West.
MEDICAL: Civilian hospital in West side of Zargabad.
ILLUMINATION: Main streets in commercial area lit at night.

SIGINT and MASINT
COLLECTION: Frequency domain MASINT and radiofrequency telemetry to point of saturation. Regular updates from listening posts within Zargabad.

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Normal radiofrequency telemetry in AO with no militarized frequencies or networks detected.

Friendly EOB Remarks: No change to Electronic Order of Battle. Multiband radio efficiency optimal due to terrain. SATCOM efficacy 97.6% with 0.32s latency.
OPFOR EOB Remarks: No known Electronic Order of Battle.

OPFOR Signals Capability:
AM/FM: Positive
MULTIBAND AN/PRC: Not known. Highly probable.
SATCOM: Highly improbable
2G: Positive
WWW: Positive, broadband probable

OPFOR SIGINT Capability:
ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES: Negative
TELEMETRY: Negative
FREQ DOMAIN MASINT: Negative
CHANNEL INTERCEPTION: Probable

SIGINT SUMMARY
OPFOR are likely to be using similar AN/PRC communication systems to friendly forces, although there is no evidence of command-structure networks. Due to the isometric nature of conflict it is highly likely that OPFOR will be using civilian mobile phone networks to communicate as well as potentially signal explosives for detonation. It is recommended that commanders advise their men to be vigilant for individuals using such devices within proximity of BLUFOR.
Due to OPFOR’s lack of SATCOM ability and MASINT, friendly digital network communications will be uncompromised. However any friendly AN/PRC networks (Manpack radios, PRR etc.) are still vulnerable to interception and are to be deemed insecure. Sensitive information transmitted over radio should to be relayed via code-names and/or digital means in lieu.


INTEL SUMMARY

Critical Vulnerabilities:
- Lack of organic BLUFOR units in AO.
-Isometric nature of warfare – difficult to distinguish between OPFOR and CIVPOP.

Critical Threats:
- IED and IDF.
-Small arms and potential AT.

Advantages and Potential Exploitations:
-Air superiority.
-Low OPFOR strategic ability.
-Foreign troops supported by CIVPOP.

Key Uncertainties:
-IED/IDF threat.
-CBRN threat.
-OPFOR vehicle capability.
OPFOR location and activity North of Zargabad.

Commanders are asked to consult the information in this dossier and disseminate only to direct subordinates at their discretion. Up-to-date intelligence concerning HUMIT, GEOINT and SIGINT/MASINT will be provided as part of mission briefing prior to operation. 

Current Dissemination
-CO RG TF
-Int Cell HQ Highroller
-OC Talon
-OC Gambler
-OC SOG (Vegas)
 
DEPLOYMENT VIDEO NOV 2012
 
 
 
 
OPERATIONAL VIDEOS
 
 
 

 

 

 

Last Updated on Wednesday, 10 April 2013 10:11